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ISLAMIC MORALITY IN LATE OTTOMAN 
“SECULAR”  SCHOOLS
 
Recent scholarship has taken great strides toward integrating the history of  the late
Ottoman Empire into world history. By moving beyond the view that the West was
the prime agent for change in the East, historians have shed new light on indigenous
eˆorts aimed at repositioning the state, reconceptualizing knowledge, and restructur-
ing “society.”
 
1
 
 A comparative perspective has helped students of  the period recog-
nize that the late Ottoman Empire shared and took action against many of  the same
problems confronting its contemporaries, East and West. The assertion of  Ottoman
agency has been critical to ˜nishing oˆ the stereotype of  the “sick man of  Europe,”
but the persistent legacies of  modernization theory and nationalist historiography
continue to obscure our view of  the period.
One ˜eld that has suˆered from the heavy-handedness of  such approaches is edu-
cation. Although education, particularly the state-supplied variety, has been widely
credited with a plethora of  momentous eˆects, few scholars have actually looked
at the schools themselves—their architecture, curricula, textbooks, and daily life. In
the absence of  detailed research on such topics, our understanding of  the state
schools has been shaped by the inertia of  the received wisdom.
 
2
 
 One of  the most
tenacious views is the notion that the schools were agents of  a seemingly inevitable
process of  secularization. Yet the materials I have examined suggest that the term
“secular” cannot be applied to schools that, while ostensibly interdenominational,
featured their own mosques, observed the Muslim calendar, taught Quråanic inter-
pretation, and emphasized a speci˜cally Islamic notion of  morality. But more than
appealing for a change in semantics, I suggest that appreciating the complexities
and tensions surrounding the issue of  religio-moral schooling allows for a further
reappraisal of  the changing relationship between the late Ottoman state and its
subjects.
In this article, I analyze the notion of  morality in late Ottoman state schools.
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 I
do so by beginning with a global level of  analysis and then restricting it to concen-
trate on a much more speci˜c instrument of  moral pedagogy: the textbook. First, I
take a brief  look at the moral component in contemporary educational programs
around the world to place the Ottoman agenda in a broader context. Concurrent
trends in such diverse countries as China, France, and Russia provide much-needed
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perspective for the Ottoman case. Second, I situate the moral agenda of  the state
school within the overall Ottoman eˆort to foster religio-moral development through
education. I suggest that Ottoman state schooling can be understood only as part of
a larger campaign intended to safeguard the empire’s future by shoring up its reli-
gious-political foundation. This moral agenda is visible in various aspects of  state
schooling: internal government memoranda arguing for steps to reverse moral de-
cay; high-level commissions charged with vetting and revamping the imperial cur-
riculum to increase religio-moral content; and the rules intended to regulate school
life. Third, after an overview of  these features of  late Ottoman schooling, I exam-
ine a speci˜c component of  the state’s plan in more detail. Two textbooks written for
the express purpose of  teaching Islamic morality in the ostensibly ecumenical schools
reveal the extent to which life in the schoolroom was suˆused with the moral mis-
sion that informed late Ottoman educational policy. The article concludes by answer-
ing the following question: How did the late Ottoman state’s reliance on morals aˆect
its relationship with its subjects?
As we shall see, the moral element in the late Ottoman approach was overtly
Islamic. Except for the fact that we have been prepared by most of  the literature on
the subject to think of  the state schools as avowedly secular, this should not be sur-
prising; in both the Tanzimat period and, especially, the reign of  Abd
 

 
lhamid II,
the state’s message was imbued with Islamic referents.
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 But the dominant approach
considers the state to have used Islam only for the purposes of  an increasingly sec-
ular agenda.
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 Although there most certainly were “secular” reasons for the state’s
selective sanction of  Islam in this context, I think it a mistake, in the words of  
 
«
 
erif
Mardin, to “underestimate the sacred.”
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 To many—both Ottoman o¯cials and later
historians—what Charles Tripp has termed the “secular logic” of  the state was in-
deed paramount,
 
7
 
 but that should not blind us to a range of  possibilities that tran-
scended a purely instrumental use of  religion.
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 Just as borrowing the apparatus of
“modern” education brought with it a range of  ideological and cultural associations,
so also were the “secular” aspects of  state-sanctioned Islam accompanied by a sweep
of  associations and implications that may have been equally powerful. The possi-
bility exists, at the very least, that many of  these nuances have been overlooked by
the historiographical tendency to emphasize the secularizing elements at the expense
of  those associated with moribund “tradition.” At any rate, it is my view that Islam
cannot be reduced to the role of  merely playing a part in an inherently secular
agenda. As we shall see, there are important signs that Ottoman o¯cials hoped that
Islam—when yoked with a “modern” delivery system—would play a more transfor-
mative role in the lives of  its students, and therefore in the future of  the empire.
Before turning to the question of  what sort of  morality the Ottoman schools con-
veyed, it is useful to step back and take in a comparative perspective. The Otto-
man attempt to integrate the Western system with moral content appropriate to the
Islamic–Ottoman context shared much with contemporary approaches to state edu-
cation elsewhere. A moral agenda of  one sort or another lay at the heart of  state ed-
ucational projects unfolding in disparate parts of  the late–19th-century globe. In the
United States, an ethical ethos so permeated public high schools that one historian
has described it as “the moral world of  the high school” into which students passed
in seamless fashion from their “God-fearing Protestant homes.”
 
9
 
 In Russia, the Otto-
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mans’ acquisitive neighbor to the north, a variety of  educational oˆerings served the
state’s campaign, or even its “crusade,” to reform society from above,
 
10
 
 but religio-
moral teaching ˜gured prominently in all of  them. Rules for “secular” schools ex-
pressed the common consideration that religion was “the foundation of  the Russian
state system.”
 
11
 
 As in the Ottoman Empire, the expansion of  public education in
Russia was symptomatic of  the secularizing logic of  the state and of  the severing of
the religious establishment’s monopoly over the written word. But it also meant that
the state increasingly relied on the cooperation of  the religious authorities and on the
lesson content they supplied.
In Central Asia, moral education was critical to educational change, both that
oˆered by the czarist government and that oˆered by the emerging Jadid move-
ment. Adeeb Khalid’s ˜ne study of  the Jadids places education at the center of  cul-
tural and social change in Central Asia.
 
12
 
 The shared features with the Ottoman
Empire are many, so close were the educational agendas of  the Jadids and the Otto-
mans. They include: (a) a profound faith in learning that Khalid calls the “cult of
knowledge”; (b) an overarching con˜dence in the corrective and transformative
power of  that knowledge, when applied through the form of  standardized education,
to “awaken” the slumbering people from the inertia of  ignorance; (c) the necessity
of  the new pedagogy to prepare young students to face the “needs of  the age”; (d) the
creation of  new schools, classroom furniture, textbooks, and wall maps in order to
carry out this modernizing mission; and (e) the penchant for combining new tech-
niques of  learning (the Jadids’ “new style” schools derived their name from a pho-
netic approach to literacy that contrasts with the syllabic approach taught in the
 
maktab
 
s, or Quråan schools) with religio-moral content distilled from the 
 
maktab
 
and madrasa curriculum. As in the Ottoman case, religious knowledge was desacra-
lized, transforming the notion of  what constituted “Islam” just as, conversely, the
“secular” nature of  modern schooling was itself  altered as it became a vehicle for
religious education. Many of  the Jadids were in contact with the Ottoman Empire,
among other parts of  the world, through travel, correspondence, and periodical sub-
scription. Although some mutual in˘uence naturally resulted, Khalid emphasizes
that Jadidism was ˜rst and foremost an indigenous phenomenon. The simultaneous
appearance of  regional permutations of  a modern, moralistic pedagogy further sup-
ports the notion that morally infused “modern” education constituted a world phe-
nomenon, and not one merely reliant upon Western European in˘uence.
In China, the parallels with the Ottoman case are remarkable. An equally proud
imperial power increasingly felt itself  under attack both from the outside world and
from internal opposition. Missionary education aˆected the government’s eˆorts, al-
though probably in a less overt manner than those of  their Ottoman counterparts. As
in the Ottoman case, military defeat concentrated educational thinking. In the wake
of  defeat by Japan in the late 19th century and the suppression of  the Boxer Rebellion
in 1900, moral instruction was emphasized as a critical component of  the “self-
strengthening” movement. The new schools that emerged as a result bowed to the
need to emulate foreign education (both European and Japanese), but they based their
curriculum on the Confucian classics.
 
13
 
 Moral-training textbooks—a new method of
inculcating the morality of  the old examination system—were employed to meet the
“educational aims” issued by the Board of  Education in 1906. As in the Ottoman
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Empire, Chinese educators sought to instill in the students of  the new schools a clus-
ter of  ideals that included loyalty to the emperor, practical study, and indigenous (i.e.,
Confucian) morality.
 
14
 
 Although this string of  countries could be extended in a num-
ber of  geographical directions,
 
15
 
 it is perhaps more apposite to revisit the subject of
moral instruction in France, the source of  the Ottoman state’s educational system.
We must start with a deceptively simple fact—namely, that the French system was
the one on which the Ottomans patterned their school-building program. We know
that the French Ministry of  Education, under Victor Duruy, drafted the report upon
which the Ottoman Education Regulation of  1869 was based.
 
16
 
 Although Abd
 

 
l-
hamid II’s educational strategy drastically altered the schools’ content and overall
 
raison d ’
 

 
tre
 
, the 1869 plan continued to serve as the touchstone for their formal
articulation well into the 20th century. Indeed, the centralized, systemic quality of
the French-to-Ottoman transfer has stood out as its chief  characteristic. This has re-
inforced the notion that the late Ottoman state was attempting to impose a highly
uniform pedagogical and disciplinary regime, the better to control its disparate re-
gions and ethnic groups. Centralizing logic featured prominently in late Ottoman
policy, to be sure, but I would suggest that relying too heavily on the more than
slightly sinister image of  the state as a ruthlessly standardizing and homogenizing
force hides many of  the subtleties, contradictions, and complexities of  late Ottoman
education. Further, such a powerful stereotype cannot stand the test of  scrutiny, either
in the Ottoman Empire or in France. The frequently cited image of  the French min-
ister of  education proudly looking at his watch and claiming to the emperor “that he
could state what, at that precise moment, all the children in France were studying”
gave rise to a powerful myth that obscured the persistence of  non-conformity and
the wild ˘uctuations that continued to characterize public education in France for
generations.
 
17
 
In fact, such historians as Fran
 

 
ois Furet, Jacques Ozouf, Mona Ozouf, and Theo-
dore Zeldin have reassessed the historiography of  French education in the 19th cen-
tury in a way that provides a suggestive if  cautionary tale for parallel developments
in the Ottoman Empire.
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 These scholars have been part of  a trend to see continuities
where previously sharp breaks dominated the view. Emphasizing the give-and-take
in the French educational context aˆords the possibility of  accommodating the per-
sistence of  traditional (particularly religious) modes alongside, or perhaps under-
neath the surface of, the new modus operandi.
Space and a lack of  parallelism in available data do not permit a detailed compar-
ison of  the French and Ottoman cases here, but two points stand out. The ˜rst is that
the French case is most instructive in pointing the way toward a realization that the
sharp lines and trajectories that have characterized the history of  education in France
have yielded to a considerably more nuanced depiction. The deeply contested na-
ture of  public education in France, the persistence of  elements of  non-conformity,
and the wide swings of  the educational pendulum between a Catholic and a sec-
ular agenda
 
19
 
 all suggest a level of  complexity that we would do well to remember
in the Ottoman case. Instead of  looking for a process of  educational 
 
adoption
 
, we are
doubtless better served by examining the ways in which the Ottoman state was en-
gaged in a process of  
 
adaptation
 
, or “Ottomanization.” The second and much more
conjectural point is that looking at the French and Ottoman experience together—
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and in a broader comparative perspective—suggests that it is perhaps more useful to
think of  educational change as taking place in “world time,” and not necessarily
as a result of  a borrowing from the West by the East.
 
20
 
 This is particularly intriguing
when we remember that national (or imperial) educational systems across the globe
placed parallel emphasis on moral education. Such simultaneity suggests that there
was a common world-time reaction to the perceived speeding up of  time,
 
21
 
 to con-
cerns about keeping abreast with the “demands of  the present,” and to the feeling
that ˘ight from the “traditional” theological understandings of  the way in which the
world worked was accelerating, leading to moral decay. New-style education ap-
peared as a seemingly universal beacon of  hope, particularly when it was meant to
convey a reworked but “traditionally” inspired notion of  morality. It is this moral
dimension, however, that is frequently overlooked in assessing educational change.
 
NEW-STY LE SCHOOLS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
 
The secondary literature almost invariably refers to the schools built by the Ottoman
state in the 19th and early 20th centuries as “secular,” “Western,” and “modern.”
 
22
 
This classi˜cation stems from an understandable desire to distinguish these state-run
institutions from those operated by the religious establishment. But such a dichot-
omy has unfortunately tended to exaggerate the diˆerences—and minimize the sim-
ilarities—between the two school systems. Equally worrisome is the extent to which
the presumption of  pedagogically induced dichotomy has underpinned a much larger
schism: the notion of  “cultural dualism,” or even “schizophrenia,” in late Ottoman
society.
 
23
 
 Attempts to ˜nd 19th-century antecedents for a therefore more “natural”
20th-century process of  secularization have juxtaposed moribund “traditional” reli-
gious instruction with triumphant “modern” secular education. Recently some schol-
ars have begun to call into question the normative and teleological assumptions
inherent in modernization theory.
 
24
 
 In a recent example of  this trend, Nikki R. Keddie
identi˜es secularization theory to be a “sub-category” of  modernization theory. This
welcome candor loses some of  its power, however, when she proceeds to outline the
development of  secularism in the Ottoman–Turkish context.
 
25
 
 Her reliance on the
work of  Niyazi Berkes for much of  this review precludes an escape from his heavily
dichotomous schema. For all its brilliance, Berkes’s work is run through with a tele-
ological approach to secularism that reduces appreciation of  the very transforma-
tions, tensions, and continuums that Keddie initially set out to assess. Whatever the
underlying reasons for its persistence (and it would be remiss to avoid mention of  a
nationalist element in the study of  secularism in Ottoman context) the putative secu-
larizing agenda of  the state schools ˘ies in the face of  what we know about the
Islamist policies of  Sultan Abd
 

 
lhamid II (r. 1876–1909). Given the extent to which
a separate trend of  scholarship has identi˜ed the period of  Sultan Abd
 

 
lhamid II with
Islamic activism, the so-called Pan-Islamic policies, it is odd that the religious di-
mension of  his educational agenda needs to be emphasized.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, archival evidence clearly shows that the Ha-
midian educational project was intended to inoculate the empire against the conta-
gion of  Western encroachment, missionary activity in particular.
 
26
 
 Here my point is
not to dismiss the received wisdom but, rather, to suggest that the schools contained
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tensions and nuances that are obscured by the monolithic nature of  the terms and the
agenda assigned to these institutions that were as complex in their genealogy of  his-
torical referents as they were in their daily functioning.
New-style schools challenged and eventually surpassed those operated by the var-
ious religious establishments, historically the purveyors of  almost all formal educa-
tion in the empire. As a result, the state schools were critical to the transformations
that took place in the late Ottoman Empire: they were central to the state’s campaign
to reassert central authority after a period of  decentralization; they were essential to
˜lling the increasingly onerous manpower requirements of  the rapidly burgeoning
state bureaucracy; by oˆering new career options to staˆ and students alike, the new
schools expanded the available range of  socio-economic opportunity; and, not least,
they provided an unprecedentedly direct level of  contact between the state and its
youngest subjects. These changes were symptomatic of  a process by which the state,
as an extension of  the sultan, was rede˜ning the relationship with his subjects.
Given the importance of  these and other changes associated with the expansion
of  state education, however, the available explanations of  the nature and purpose of
the education in question are disquietingly problematic. The state schools have in-
variably been described as agents of  the intertwined and all-encompassing forces of
“secularization” and “modernization,” a matter to which we return later. Concerning
the question of  the underlying purpose behind the schools, even those few scholars
who recognize the importance of  the state’s Islamic pro˜le tend to ascribe it to a cyn-
ical attempt to mobilize the population by appealing to Islam as the common denom-
inator to which the majority of  the empire’s population could adhere. The extent to
which the state altered or “invented” traditions in this eˆort has been well shown by
the pioneering work of  Selim Deringil. But as has been shown, there is a danger that
this interpretation reduces Islam to something akin to mere window dressing—prop-
aganda that conceals a “concrete policy of  a rational secular programme.”
 
27
 
Although there was much in the late Ottoman educational endeavor that con-
forms to such an instrumental interpretation (as the discussion of  loyalty and quiet-
ism to be taken up later in this article shows), our understanding of  it should, in my
view, be balanced by an appreciation of  the considerable extent to which it incor-
porated elements of  the Ottoman and Islamic tradition for its own sake. The fact that
the state used Islam for its own “rational” ends should not diminish its evocative
and ultimately otherworldly power. Conversely, the quasi-religious faith that Otto-
mans from across the political spectrum placed in education to transform society
reveals the extent to which a supra-rational dimension can be discerned in an osten-
sibly profane endeavor. At any rate, state bureaucrats involved in the educational
expansion of  the late Ottoman period frequently stressed the imperative of  upholding
what in today’s parlance might be termed “Ottoman values.” They feared that the
empire’s youth were being “seduced” away from their religion, ways of  thought, and
life patterns, including ways of  dress, by the models associated with foreign en-
croachment.
 
28
 
 To combat the noxious eˆects of  this in˘uence, these o¯cials argued
for more state schools, usually referred to as “Muslim schools,” with an educational
program that would stress morality. As we shall see, the moral lessons provided in
the late Ottoman state curriculum were decidedly Islamic, forcing us to rethink some
of  the notions associated with the presumed split between “religious” and “secular”
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education that has pervaded the secondary literature on the subject. The late–19th-
century Ottoman approach thus combined the optimism engendered by the relatively
new conception of  education as worldly or profane science (
 
maarif
 
) with the Islamic
underpinning that had been crucial to o¯cial Ottoman legitimation for centuries.
While the frequently overlooked continuities with some aspects of  the madrasa
tradition are quite striking (e.g., a student body segregated from the rest of  the pop-
ulation, distinctive clothing, special food provided on the important dates of  the
Muslim calendar, etc.), I wish to make clear that I am not arguing that an essential-
ized, unchanged “Islam” acted in the Hamidian state schools as it did in the more
typical context of  the 
 
maktab
 
 and madrasa, where religious content suˆused the en-
tire endeavor. To be sure, the new-style schools were based on a very diˆerent epis-
temological and organizational approach. My understanding is that the hybridity of
the new-style schools suggests that instead of  looking for contrasts between the
“old” and the “new,” we should be prepared for a continuum of  possible permutations
combining elements of  both traditions, changing each one in the process.
Those expecting to ˜nd evidence of  “secular” schools of  the secondary literature
among the archival material in the Ottoman archives in Istanbul will be sorely dis-
appointed. Instead they will encounter schools intended to serve a most anti-secular
agenda. Built in large part to counter the growing in˘uence of  the West, out˜tted
with a curriculum redesigned in the Hamidian era to give much greater weight to
Ottoman and Islamic tradition, decorated with the symbols of  state-sanctioned
Islam, staˆed with healthy numbers of  ulema, and organized around the Muslim
calendar, the Hamidian schools can hardly be explained using the terms “Western”
or “Westernizing.”
Indeed, a primary reason for educational expansion in the Hamidian period was to
improve the moral qualities of  the empire’s youth by reasserting indigenous values—
namely, Islamic morality. In this respect, the Hamidian educational agenda diˆered
substantially from that of  the preceding period of  reforms known collectively as the
Tanzimat. Broadly speaking, state education during the Tanzimat had been more
about imitating the best attributes of  Western European education, French in partic-
ular.
 
29
 
 Less thought was given to the ways in which French-style schooling could be
adapted to bene˜t the particular exigencies of  the Ottoman context. Under Abd
 

 
l-
hamid II, by contrast, state-sponsored education began to assert a much more inde-
pendent streak, largely as a response to the perception that the growing presence of
foreign missionary schools was undermining Ottoman eˆorts aimed at fostering
feelings of  loyalty and “Ottomanness.”
From this standpoint, the Hamidian educational agenda resorted to indigenous
values. Teaching the empire’s young subjects the skills deemed necessary to survive
“the demands of  the present” was of  course critical, but the Hamidian project placed
new emphasis on loyalty, moral character, and right conduct.
 
30
 
 It identi˜ed the new-
style school as the main weapon in the struggle against foreign encroachment and
internal moral decline.
The broad Hamidian desire to re-emphasize Islamic morality manifested itself  in
speci˜c, pragmatic policies. Once the government had cleared the ground—and the
funding—for a spate of  school construction after 1884, the year in which the Edu-
cation Tax was enacted, the moral agenda began to appear. Its thrust can be detected
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in two main areas: curricular and extracurricular. Beginning in early 1885, the sultan
impaneled a series of  commissions and charged them with vetting the curriculum
inherited from the preceding regime. Although the ˜rst commission seems to have
made little progress,
 
31
 
 subsequent incarnations were clearly more eˆective. Within
a year’s time, the sultan appointed another commission, this time chaired by the
 
⁄
 
eyh
 

 
lislam
 
, the highest-ranking member of  the ulema in the empire. After review-
ing all of  the empire’s school levels, the commission produced a report recommend-
ing that Arabic, like French, be taught in every grade of  the 
 
idad
 

 
 schools and in
all of  the higher institutions in the capital.
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 Next, it recommended creating new
“courses on the biographies and features of  the Prophets, the historical deeds of  the
companions of  the Prophet, and the biographies of  the religious authorities and the
famous ulema.”
 
33
 
 Further, it proposed that the projected lessons in religious prin-
ciples include “the instruction of  the science of  morals (
 
ilm-i ahl
 

 
k
 
) and of  Islamic
jurisprudence (
 
f
 
ı
 
k
 
ı
 
h
 
) in abridged form.”
By augmenting the time in the schoolday spent on courses such as Arabic and
morals, the curricular review aimed at modifying the Tanzimat-era lesson plan with
content it deemed appropriate to the task of  moral regeneration. In this endeavor
it was conscious of  the success that non-Muslim schools in the empire had enjoyed
due to the inculcation of  moral principles. The imperial decree establishing the com-
mission had made explicit mention of  the enviable state of  moral instruction in
the non-Muslim schools of  the empire, noting that “[b]y reorganizing their curricula,
the non-Muslim schools have striven for excellence with respect to their students’
morals and have produced results.”
 
34
 
 By contrast, in the Muslim schools, “the oppo-
site situation is a source of  regret to the sultan.” The reference to the state institutions
as being “Muslim schools” is telling; nominally interdenominational, they were
nevertheless conceived of  as instruments of  a broader attempt to reassert the Islamic
basis of  the empire. As a result of  this and other, similarly guided curricular-reform
eˆorts, moral education, absent in the Tanzimat-era educational plan of  1869,
 
35
 
 came
to be inserted into the imperial curriculum. A memorandum of  the Meclis-i Mahsus
from 1900 makes clear, however, that the process of  curricular modi˜cation required
continual attention. This memorandum noted that although lessons in morals had
been added to some of  the schools’ curricula, the texts available were de˜cient, con-
sisting of  treatises “composed from here and there.”
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 The presence of  such defec-
tive moral texts combined with the fact that ulema were not the ones providing the
instruction caused the high-ranking signatories to this memorandum to worry about
the future. Their concerns and the remedy they propose underscore the centrality of
the moral dimension in state education:
 
It is obvious that men whose religious principles are contaminated with weakness will truly
not be able to serve faith and state (
 
din 
 

 
 devlet
 
). Since it is natural that this situation will
bring about moral and material harms, and considering that it is the Sultan’s absolute wish
that su¯cient attention be paid to the teaching of  the necessary lessons in the schools and
that religious duties be completely ful˜lled, ˜rst, an inspection committee (
 
heyet
 
) com-
posed of  twelve individuals, eight ulema and four civil o¯cials, should be appointed. The
aforementioned committee will examine the situation of  all of  the Muslim schools, the
school curricula, and degree to which the lessons are in agreement with what is desired.
 
37
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Further, this committee was to ascertain whether Islamic duties were being per-
formed outside of  class, as well as whether potentially detrimental material, such as
Western philosophy (
 
felsefe
 
), was being taught in the classroom.
 
38
 
 It seems highly
likely that this sort of  scrutiny produced the two textbooks on morals to be examined
shortly.
By the turn of  the century, then, the modi˜cation process ensured that religious
and moral sciences (
 
ul
 

 
m-u diniye ve ahl
 

 
kiye
 
) assumed a dominant place in the
weekly schedule.
 
39
 
 Listed ˜rst in the lesson program, these courses were to receive
a constant three hours per week in a schedule that ranged from nineteen to twenty-
four hours. The only courses that surpassed this total were those in Turkish and
French. The textbooks seem to have been written in accordance with the stipulations
associated with moral instruction in the 1899–1900 curriculum. As we shall see, they
reveal that the time allotted to moral instruction during classtime was intended to be
used to cover speci˜cally Islamic material.
Having taken measures to control what was to be taught in the classroom, the
education bureaucracy was nevertheless unwilling to leave it at that, making eˆorts
aimed at controlling actual practice. It maintained a vigilant attitude toward lapses
in moral rectitude on the part of  both teachers and students. Consider the case of  a
certain Midhat Bey, an instructor at the Mekteb-i M
 

 
lkiye, the prominent school for
training civil o¯cials in the capital. In 1890, reports reached the palace that Midhat
Bey had been taking liberties with the curriculum and textbook stipulated for his his-
tory course.
 
40
 
 He seems to have had his charges spending long hours on ancient
Egyptian, Greek, and Roman history, leaving them little time for their other sub-
jects. What is more, he was reported to have subverted school decorum by mocking
his fellow teachers and making light of  the school’s activities. Worse still was the
charge that he was undermining the religious principles of  his students. Apart from
certain unspeci˜ed transgressions regarding Christianity, he was accused of  having
mockingly discussed religious principles (
 
akaid-i diniye
 
), “the lofty morals of  some
of  the Prophets,” and the four orthodox schools of  Islamic jurisprudence.
 
41
 
 The im-
perial decree that responded to this case stressed that teachers should not stray from
the prescribed texts. Rather, they should give serious attention to correcting their
students’ belief  (
 
tashih-i i’tikad
 
) and to their moral instruction (
 
tehzib-i ahl
 

 
k
 
). Ex-
trapolating from the case at hand, the decree goes on to declare that “in the Islamic
schools the subject requiring the utmost attention is the matter of  strengthening
Islamic principles.”
 
42
 
While the educational establishment was thus trying to insure that what was taught
inside the classroom matched the newly altered curriculum, it was simultaneously
manifesting an interest in what was taking place outside of  class. Monitoring of  ex-
tracurricular life took several forms, although they can be treated only summarily
in the scope of  this article.
 
43
 
 Several steps were taken to provide a formal structure
that would induce students to live in compliance with the moral lessons they were
being taught. Both the yearly calendar and the daily regimen followed an Islamic
rhythm. Such important times as the month of  Ramadan and the Prophet’s birth-
day were marked on the school calendar.
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 Likewise, the schoolday accommodated
time for students to pray.
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 Moreover, as more and more state schools at the second-
ary level were converted to boarding institutions,
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 the state assumed some parental
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functions. School regulations charged speci˜c member of  the schools’ staˆ with
supervising moral comportment. For example, the assistants (
 
muavin
 
) were assigned
both the general responsibility of  enjoining harmonious relations and preventing
quarrels among the students and such speci˜c tasks as, when assigned nightly guard
duty, sleeping in the students’ dormitory, rising a quarter of  an hour before their
charges in the morning, monitoring their getting dressed “in orderly and prompt
fashion” and performing their ablutions and, after prayer, directing them toward their
study halls.
 
47
 
 An assistant needed to be present to take the roll, monitor students
while they ate, and supervise them when they studied their lessons.
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 The overseers
(
 
mubass
 
ı
 
r
 
) were to play a supporting role to the assistants and, in schools having no
assistants, to ful˜ll their functions. The overseers were assigned never to leave the stu-
dents’ side during recess and were also required to act as hall monitors during class-
time to observe the behavior of  those students excused from class by the assistants.
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Eventually, these rules were deemed to require bolstering, and an order was issued
to augment the supervisory role of  a third o¯cial, the vice-principal (
 
m
 

 
dir-i sani
 
).50
By 1906, with the appearance of  opposition groups in state schools, the Hamidian
government had ample cause to worry about more than the potentially immoral
side of  unsupervised student activity, but it was the area of  religio-moral learning
and behavior that the new regulation addressed. The vice-principals were to over-
see lessons relating to religious and moral sciences, devoting special attention to
instruction in religious manners (dab-i diniye) and proper morals (ahlk-i hasane),
and to monitor the students’ religio-moral conduct.51 Monitoring could be reinforced
with preliminary warnings and subsequent punishment.52 In classic bureaucratic
fashion, an attempt to quantify moral conduct developed. The vice-principal was to
maintain registers to record each student’s moral instruction and behavior, and the
degree to which he performed his religious obligations. At the end of  each year, stu-
dents were to be assigned scores corresponding to their religious and moral educa-
tion (terbiye-i diniye ve ahlkiye), with the aggregate sum printed on their diplomas.
Thus, a student’s religio-moral behavior was to have a potentially lasting impact on
his career.
Naturally, these regulations tell us only about the state’s intent. How such o¯cials
actually understood these tasks and whether they acted accordingly are of  course
much more di¯cult to ascertain.53 Nevertheless, all of  the above means of  stipulating
and then enforcing pedagogical and everyday life were related to a broad desire to
bolster morality and discipline through state schooling. Let us now turn to how mor-
als were understood in the context of  late Ottoman education.
THE MEANING OF “MORALS”
Conceived as a means of  combating the negative eˆects of  the Western penetra-
tion into the Ottoman Empire, the instruction of  morals was largely envisioned as
a corrective measure. In order to mitigate the deleterious consequences of  foreign
in˘uence, imperial subjects needed only to be returned to the true path. It is im-
portant to bear in mind that the Hamidian educational project was not simply, as
modernization theory would have had us believe, an attempt to import “modern”
practices and modes of  thinking into the imperial domains.54 It did, of  course, engage
in such direct importation, but it was ultimately concerned with preserving the em-
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pire by adopting Western methods but then adapting them for its own purposes. In-
deed, the Western-based school system with its centralized planning proved easy to
modify. The insertion of  moral content into the curriculum was perhaps the de˜ning
example of  the Hamidian eˆort to re˜t the Tanzimat curriculum to accord with its
view of  late Ottoman realities.
But what exactly was the term “morals” meant to convey? In what follows, I
examine both the state’s campaign to reinsert morality into the curriculum and two
textbooks speci˜cally written to teach morals to late Ottoman students. But ˜rst I
consider the philological and contextual evidence of  the meaning of  morals in the
Hamidian context. Semseddin Sami’s dictionary of  1900, incidentally published to
commemorate the twenty-˜fth anniversary of  Abdlhamid’s reign, is instructive in
this regard.55 The entry under hulk de˜nes that term as “natural disposition” or
“characteristic” but goes on to dwell on the plural form ahlk. Three de˜nitions are
provided. The ˜rst oˆers a neutral stance, stating that ahlk are both the good and
bad dispositions with which every person is endowed. The second meaning is that
of  a particular division of  philosophy that treats the issue of  human ethics. The third
de˜nition moves away from the normative neutrality of  the ˜rst two meanings. No
longer both good and bad, ahlk are here de˜ned solely as “good dispositions” (iyi
huylar) and as “the virtues (fezail ) that adorn the human being with respect to sense
and truth” (ma’nen ve hakikaten). “In students, morals are to be looked for before
all things.” The term “public morality” (ahlk-i umum) is then introduced and de-
˜ned as “the qualities that have been accepted as custom in a society.” An example
follows: “It is absolutely necessary to protect public morality from sedition (fesad).”56
It is this last, communal sense that informs the usage of  the term “morals” in the par-
lance of  the late Ottoman educational project.
In the context of  o¯cial memoranda, in fact, the term “morals” was given little
positive de˜nition; rather, it was the absence of  morals and religious principles
(akaid-i diniye) and their being “broken” (bozuk) that stand out.57 This absence was
blamed for the heedlessness of  Ottoman youth and for a general loss of  Islamic iden-
tity exhibited by change in dress and ways of  thinking, and the adoption of  “Frank-
ish habits.”58 Ultimately, the sorry state of  morals was deemed to have an adverse
eˆect on loyalty to the Ottoman state and its titular head, the sultan or caliph.
Although the notion of  morals could thus connote a range of  meanings, the author-
ities, both in the provinces and in the capital, advanced the notion of  intensi˜ed
moral instruction as the solution to reverse the disappointing trends they identi˜ed
in the realm of  public morality. In order to restore public morality, the late Ottoman
educational campaign deployed a variety of  means. Perhaps the most trusted vehi-
cle was the written text, to which we turn shortly. But it was only one element of
many aimed at revivifying the empire’s moral life. Mosque and school were the twin
instruments of  that policy. Internal government memoranda show that the state
conceived of  these ostensibly distinct institutions as ful˜lling the same agenda—
namely, strengthening the moral ˜ber of  the empire’s Muslim subjects so that they
could better withstand the onslaught of  foreign missionaries and the lure of  Western
fashion, both cultural and intellectual. In the provinces of  Iraq, in Syria, and on
Cyprus, state funds intended to defray the expenses of  school construction were used
for what Deringil has termed counter-propaganda. Itinerant ulema were sent to the
countryside to inveigh against the foreign threat.59 Again, while the state may have
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seen such eˆorts to harness Islam as part of  a propaganda campaign, there is also
ample evidence to suggest that there was more at work than mere instrumentalism
can explain. I see the Ottoman educational campaign, its moral component in par-
ticular, as being pitched at a more holistic, more totalizing level. It was as if  by
combining Islamic morality with the Western educational system, so successfully
demonstrated by Europeans in their home countries and on Ottoman territory by
both foreign missionaries and the empire’s own minority groups, Ottoman o¯cial-
dom hoped to have discovered a formula that would allow the empire to vault over
its many problems.
Those youths already enrolled in state schools were easier to reach. Bolstering the
main solution—namely, the emphasis on moral instruction—was a complementary
set of  actions that included increasing the instruction of  Arabic, adding theological
subjects to the curriculum, assigning texts devoted to the life of  the Prophet Muham-
mad, and enforcing religious observance. As I suggested earlier, state monitoring of
student behavior represented an attempt to enforce outside the classroom those les-
sons which were taught inside it. In short, the Ottoman educational project was more
than a pedagogical one; it sought to take a growing share of  the empire’s youth, enroll
them in its schools, clothe them in its uniforms, house many of  them in dormitories,
teach them within the classroom through state-sanctioned textbooks, and, to the ex-
tent that it was possible, supervise their activity outside it. It is important, however,
to distinguish between intention and result. Largely because the latter is so persis-
tently di¯cult to recover, scholarship on late Ottoman education has concentrated
almost exclusively on the state’s desiderata and has tended to make some remarkable
assumptions about the way state-supplied learning was received by its students. For
the moment, su¯ce it to say that care must be taken to avoid bringing preconcep-
tions to the as-yet-to-be-written Rezeptionsgeschichte of  late Ottoman education.
Let us now turn to two of  the vehicles used to impart these lessons. The Rehber-
i Ahlk (Guide to Morals) and the Łlm-i Ahlk (Science of  Morals) were published at
the turn of  the century for the express purpose of  moral instruction in Ottoman state
schools.60 Although we know almost nothing about the authors of  these texts,61 any
speci˜c material that they might have replaced, or the way they would have been
used inside the classroom or outside of  it, their analysis nevertheless suggests that
central government policy had by 1900 made its presence felt in tangible form at the
local level.
TWO TEXTBOOKS ON MORALS
The ˜rst text to be considered here, the Rehber-i Ahlk, is written in a simpler style
and is considerably shorter than its higher-level analog. Let us ˜rst consider its form,
which both reveals and conceals its agenda. Like the late Ottoman education proj-
ect generally, the Rehber-i Ahlk mixes elements inspired by Western Europe with
those exhibiting a clearly Islamic and Ottoman lineage. The text would seem to owe
its very existence to having been selected to assist in the instruction of  one of  many
courses comprising a curriculum mandated by the central government in a system
inspired by the example of  Western Europe. Further, the fact that each student seems
to have had his own copy of  the work—based on examination of  actual texts in
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which the students inscribed their names or applied their seals (mhr)—distin-
guishes it from the “traditional” pedagogical practice of  the Islamic world.62 Perhaps
it is our own late–20th-century view of  the place of  religious subjects in the school
curriculum that makes us think so, but there is an important distinction to be drawn
between the internal consistency of  the core curriculum of  the madrasa experience
and the contrasting polyglot nature of  the Hamidian curriculum. Combining morals
with chemistry and French derives from a very diˆerent tradition from the one that
linked grammar, logic, theology, and jurisprudence.63
Several of  the text’s formal aspects likewise call to mind the Western pedagogical
tradition. The physical appearance of  the pages of  the bulk of  the text in the Rehber
exhibits a feature quite rare in late Ottoman literary production: glossary entries are
supplied below the main text in the form of  a footnote apparatus.64 The notes, sepa-
rated from the main text by a horizontal line, serve to explicate words and phrases
presumably considered di¯cult to the student readers.
Punctuation is another strikingly exogenous feature of  the text in question. The
script tradition of  the Arabo-Islamic world typically eschews punctuation. Over the
course of  the 19th century, this began to change. Punctuation marks and spacing
devices such as indented paragraphs representative of  the Latin-based scripts crept
into the printed and, less frequently, handwritten texts produced in the Ottoman
Empire. The trend that rendered Ottoman institutions increasingly similar in formal
appearance to their Western counterparts was thus reinforced by a parallel movement
in the literary and cultural spheres of  the empire. The Rehber re˘ects this trend, ex-
hibiting many characteristics of  the Western editorial tradition. Hyphens, commas,
ellipses, question marks, exclamation points, quotation marks, and periods all appear
liberally throughout the text, as does the separation and indentation of  paragraphs.
In most cases, such punctuation is curiously redundant. For example, periods almost
invariably appear in the wake of  verbal forms that inherently indicate the conclusion
of  the thought expressed.65 Commas and periods often unnecessarily precede the
conjunctive particle ki, which itself  signals the arrival of  a clause.66 These largely
super˜cial aspects of  the Rehber’s formal articulation re˘ect the broader pattern of
adapting Western modes of  organization re˘ected in the state school system and in
important aspects of  late Ottoman society generally.
There is, however, a more substantive aspect of  the text’s formal organization that
suggests the strong in˘uence not of  the Western but of  the Ottoman and Islamic her-
itage. This is the fact that approximately 90 percent of  the text appears in the form
of  questions posed by a student and the answers supplied by a teacher.67 This di-
dactic method recalls an important mode of  theological disputation prevalent in
the Islamic tradition.68 Of  closer provenance is the question-and-answer format to be
found in the opinions (fetva) rendered by the Ottoman ⁄eyhlislams since the early
years of  the empire and by all muftis since very early in Islamic history.69 The ques-
tion–response technique is a formal device that also has a direct bearing on the con-
tent of  the text. Like the fetva-rendering of  the ⁄eyhlislam, the voice providing the
answers has an unquestionably authoritative role. “The student” poses the questions,
which are, of  course, fully and correctly answered by “the teacher.” Even the terms
used to denote these two roles contribute to de˜ning the sense of  the knowledge be-
ing imparted. While the term for questioner is the Persian-derived word ⁄akird, the
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word denoting the teacher is the Arabic muallim (or occasionally hoca; see later).
Now, in the o¯cial parlance of  the state-education apparatus generally, ⁄akird is vir-
tually interchangeable with the Arabic talebe. But synonyms for muallim, such as
stad, rarely appear. Given the Hamidian-era trend toward re-emphasizing the Is-
lamic dimension in education, this nomenclature adds to the religious nuance of  the
teacher–student relationship. For the term muallim has a clear semantic association
with the ilmiye, the religious establishment responsible for “traditional” learning.
Such learning, ilm, is to be understood in contradistinction to the “new style” ed-
ucation, referred to as maarif, and usually parsed as the “learning of  useful things”
or as “the process of  becoming acquainted with things unknown.”70 The nuance of
religious authority imparted by the term muallim is particularly pronounced in a
context where the teacher is holding forth on the subject of  morality.
It is only when we move beyond the Rehber ’s form to consider its content that
we see how squarely it stands in the Islamic and Ottoman traditions. Given the
fact that this text was created for use in an ostensibly interdenominational educa-
tional project, its use of  strictly Muslim sources and concepts is striking.
The Islamic identity of  the text appears through both form and substance. The
most obvious examples of  this are the mention of  the Prophet Muhammad, the in-
clusion of  speci˜cally Islamic duties and injunctions, and the citation of  hadith. The
Prophet is ˜rst mentioned in the section of  the text devoted to explaining diyanet,
which might be translated as “religion,” “religiosity,” or “piety.” In response to the
student’s question, “In what way are we to be religious?” the teacher responds in
quintessentially Islamic terms.
By always performing and implementing without hesitation all of  the commands of  God, the
Possessor of  Majesty, and our Prophet Muhammad Mustafa, may God the Exalted bless him
with the best salutations; by pronouncing the Attestation of  Faith; by performing prayers ˜ve
times [per day] in the direction of  the kıble [i.e., toward Mecca] in a pure state; by fasting;
by giving alms; if  it is in our capacity, by performing the pilgrimage to Mecca; and, without
any shortcoming or deliberation, by loving them [i.e., God and His Prophet] with the utmost
capacity of  our hearts and keeping them in our mind and mention at all times.71
It would be di¯cult to ˜nd more explicit evidence of  the text’s Islamic identity than
this articulation of  the Five Pillars of  Islam.
Other important features of  Islamic discourse reinforce the Rehber’s sectarian
nature. Most obvious is the liberal sprinkling of  hadith, the reported sayings and
doings of  the Prophet Muhammad, to bolster the argument. For example, the section
on cleanliness (nezafet) begins with the student’s typically simple query: “What is
cleanliness?” To this the teacher replies,
Teacher— Maintaining orderliness in our clothes, our belongings, and our bodies [lit. all
our limbs].
Student — Why must we be orderly?
Teacher— In the ˜rst place, in accordance with the meaning of  the noble Hadith (Cleanli-
ness stems from belief  [al-nazafah min al-Øman]), our maintaining orderliness is
one of  the divine commands; secondly, . . .72
The hadith stands out from the rest of  the text both through the use of  parentheses
and its being rendered in the original Arabic.
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When the Rehber seeks to inculcate key values deemed necessary to the mainte-
nance of  discipline in the schools, it is no coincidence that many of  these values
have a clearly Islamic resonance. These include such concepts as religiosity (diya-
net); laudable moral qualities (ahlk-ı hamide); cleanliness (nezafet); eˆort (mesai );
ascetic discipline (riyazet); sound management (hsn- idare); contentment (kanaat);
knowledge (ilm); patience (sabır); forbearance (hilm); and order (intizam). The Reh-
ber devotes a chapter to explaining these concepts and more through the question-
and-answer format. Interestingly, the longest chapters are those on obedience and
respect and on faithfulness. Let us turn to the ˜rst of  these to see how the author
marshals Islamic principles in imparting his catechism.
Student— What is obedience?
Teacher— Submission to and reliance on the commands, according to the canonical law of
Islam (⁄er-i ⁄erif ), of  those who are more intelligent and greater than we with re-
spect to both age and station.
Student — Whom must we obey?
Teacher— It is a necessity that we obey and respect [the following:] First, God the Exalted,
the Creator and Destroyer of  places, hearts, and especially, all creatures; secondly,
the Prophet, the Possessor of  Glory; thirdly, those greater than we, such as our father
and mother, the Sultan, the teacher, and o¯cers.73
It is clear from this passage that the implicit hierarchy is both an Islamic and an
Ottoman one. Mention of  God alone could, of  course, refer to any religion’s concep-
tion of  the deity, but when the word Allah is immediately followed by the Arabic for-
mula taçalla (meaning “may [He] be exalted”), so typical of  Islamic phrasing, the
speci˜cally Islamic nature of  the text is clear. This is immediately con˜rmed by the
second object of  obedience, the Prophet Muhammad. Parents are inherently univer-
sal, but in the context of  the imperial school system, the mention of  sultan, teacher,
and o¯cers have obvious Ottoman referents.
The Islamic–Ottoman link implicit in this passage revisits the tone established
in the Introduction (mukaddeme). This section begins by praising God and lauding
the sultan’s role in causing education to be spread throughout the empire through the
establishment of  schools, printing houses, and libraries, each of  which is a “proof
announcing the Truth.”74 The Hamidian educational agenda cements the connection
between the divine and the imperial. The dissemination of  knowledge in this context
means the spreading of  religion. Precisely which religion is being referred to is clear
from the Islamic basis of  the Ottoman Empire in general and the speci˜cally Islamic
phrasing employed.
The Islamic elements of  the Rehber are, however, not limited to formal or se-
mantic associations. As was shown in the examples cited earlier, a clearly Islamic
conception of  thought and action informs the content of  the text. Perhaps more
signi˜cant than this variety of  Islamic elements in the Rehber is the extent to which
its author draws on them in pursuing his pedagogical agenda.
In its explanation of  morals, Ali Łrfan’s Rehber emphasizes qualities that are of
great importance to the neo-patrimonial and bureaucratized nature of  the late–
19th-century Ottoman Empire. Religious justi˜cation is marshalled in support of
an interrelated cluster of  attributes that I label “quietist.” This brings together
such complementary qualities as respect for authority, duty, loyalty, and hierarchy,
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all critical to the Hamidian neo-patrimonial agenda. Indeed, the Rehber’s approach to
the related concepts of  obedience, loyalty, and morality resembled those voiced by
the former Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Pa⁄a:
Loyalty is honesty in words and deeds, [it is] material and moral safekeeping. The following
concepts are all derived from loyalty: Blessedness, compassion, probity, and patriotism. Pos-
sessors of  these qualities are called loyal and those who prefer their opposites are liars and
traitors. Happiness and peace in the aˆairs of  the state originate from loyalty.75
The rapid expansion of  the Ottoman bureaucracy in the 19th century entailed qual-
itative as well as quantitative change. The proliferation of  ministries and commis-
sions, and the elaboration of  a palace bureaucracy that paralleled that of  the Sublime
Porte, all required considerable manpower. The men taken into this expanded scribal
service had to be not only capable bureaucrats but loyal servants of  the sultan, as
well. The state school system was charged with the critical task of  producing such
doubly suitable candidates. The Rehber’s attempt to inculcate the key values listed
earlier illustrates one facet of  the state’s campaign to supply the state’s personnel
needs—and to do so in a way that directly links its institutional, bureaucratic task
with its religio-moral agenda.
The quietism of  the Rehber makes frequent use of  patently Islamic tenets and prin-
ciples but also reaches beyond the strictly canonical domain to delineate a broader
conception of  normative behavior. The clearest example of  the way the text extends
beyond the realm of  the shariça, where Quråan and hadith directly support the text,
and into the sphere of  less clearly religious areas of  human interaction, is the way
it treats the concept of  duty. As shown in the discussion of  the text’s discussion of  the
Five Pillars of  Islam, the Rehber makes ample use of  core Islamic notions in adum-
brating one aspect of  those duties incumbent on the individual (farz-i ayn). A cog-
nate of  the same term (feriza, pl. feraiz, meaning religious duty) appears in the text,
connoting duties not associated with Islamic practice per se, such as the universal
obligation to love one’s parents, siblings, friends (or whatever one holds dear76) and
the need to work and to avoid its opposite, laziness.77 Conversely, the text takes gen-
eral notions found in the Quråan and hadith and provides a practical application.
Thus, the oft-repeated patience (sabır) of  the Quråan assumes a more speci˜c con-
text in the chapter by the same name in the Rehber:
Student— What is patience?
Teacher— Patience means enduring every misfortune and calamity. As for this, it is such a
˜ne and admirable moral quality that just as when we are patient we endure with-
out complaint every evil [that befalls us], so also do we never pay attention to the
cal umnies made against us by evil and corrupt men, and we are on guard against
soiling our tongue with cursing and oˆense.78
This hypothetical context of  practicing patience is given further grounding in a sub-
sequent passage by more nearly ˜xing its temporal and geographical locus.
Student— What are the merits of  patience?
Teacher— When are patient, it does not do to be grieved or sorry in the face of  illnesses,
misfortune, and grief. By always saying, (God has ordained it this way[;] it is nec-
essary to be patient and bear it. [T]his, too, will certainly pass.), we do not allow
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the illnesses and troubles to increase but rather we are always hopeful that we will
˜nd health and prosperity. . . . Apart from that, if  we are good, we will have per-
formed good deeds for the state and the millet, bene˜ted everyone, and rendered per-
manent our good name in this world.79
A similar concern for regulating daily activity appears in other attributes of  the
Rehber’s quietism. The concepts of  forbearance (hilm), order (intizam), obedience
and respect (itaat  ihtiram), and restraining the tongue (zabt-ı lisan) each have their
own chapter in the text. In delineating and advocating these attributes, the text mixes
religious and non-religious justi˜cation. Thus, it argues for restraining the tongue
both by presenting the Arabic of  the hadith, Salamat al-insan fØ hifz al-lisan (man’s
well-being stems from restraining his tongue) and by citing the Turkish folk proverb
Ok yarası geer ama dil yarası gemez (the wound of  an arrow will pass but not the
wound in˘icted by the tongue).80 Likewise, the Rehber relies on both what it terms
“religious” and “natural” reasons in advocating love and respect for one’s parents.
The text reinforces the dual nature of  its argumentation by citing both “holy books”
(kutub-u mukaddese) and evidence from the animal kingdom.81 Interestingly, such
love and respect should also characterize the student’s relationship with his teacher
(hoca).
Student— In what way should we respect their excellencies, our honorable teachers (mualli-
min-i kiramımız hazeratını)?
Teacher— It is our duty to love our hocas, like our parents, more than everyone else, never to
forget them by committing their advice and wise writings to memory, to conform
to them always, and sometimes even if  due to our inopportune actions they become
angry, scold, or blame, not to resist them but to be quiet and obedient and never
to blame or insult them, to learn by heart the assignments and lessons they assign,
to complete our education, and, after obtaining the diploma, to treat them with
extraordinary respect and obedience even if  we become more knowledgeable and
superior [to them in rank].82
The text de˜nes the teacher’s role explicitly in parental terms.
Student— Why must we respect our teachers?
Teacher— The rights of  our teachers (muallim) are every bit as great as those of  our parents
with respect to us. Because [while] our parents are the cause of  our existence and
our growth, our teachers rescue us from the world of  ignorance by teaching us and
instructing us in both upbringing (terbiye) and science and knowledge (ulm u
fnn). In this respect we come to be considered distinguished and respected by the
people. We live with all repose, and, ultimately, we leave life with a lasting good
name.83
As this passage demonstrates, the position of  the teacher vis--vis the student not
only equals but exceeds that of  his parents. By initiating the student into the realm
of  terbiye and science and knowledge, the teacher provides access to a world of  ease
where he can make his mark. This is a world to which, by implication, the parents do
not belong. Their role in the child’s life is reduced to birth and early childhood de-
velopment.84 Parents are thus equated with the “world of  ignorance.” It is a telling
aspect of  the state’s moralizing campaign that it is the teacher, in this context clearly
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an extension of  the Ottoman state, who can rescue the student from the ignorant orbit
of  the family.
An analysis of  the second textbook con˜rms and reinforces many of  the themes
that appear in the ˜rst. For this reason and in the interest of  space, I shall address
only some of  the most salient features of  Ali Rıza’s Łlm-i Ahlk. The diˆerences be-
tween the two works seems to derive largely from the diˆerent level of  their in-
tended student readers. While the Rehber was composed for advanced primary and,
presumably, lower secondary pupils, the second text aimed at the secondary level
only. More than twice as long, organized in a more epistemologically advanced man-
ner, composed in a more sophisticated prose, and with fewer of  the simple pedagog-
ical devices of  the ˜rst, the Łlm-i Ahlk provided its readers with a more detailed
treatment of  morality.
It is clear from the work’s Introduction that it was intended to ˜ll a perceived lack
of  textbooks devoted to moral instruction. Ali Rıza writes that “while numerous
works are being published in connection with the arts and sciences (ulm u fnn),
there still has been nothing published in book form concerning the science of  morals
as stipulated in the book list for the civil school curriculum recently published by the
Ministry of  Education.”85 Ali Łrfan, the author of  the Rehber, makes a similar allu-
sion to the lack of  books on morals by referring to the fact that libraries were packed
with all manner of  books on the arts and sciences, but that it was moral lessons that
were critical across the entire span of  a child’s education.86 While Ali Rıza reveals a
more explicit connection between o¯cial desiderata, as represented in the ministry’s
publication, and the appearance of  his book, both texts seem strongly linked to
o¯cial objectives. Equally noteworthy is what Ali Rıza has to say about his meth-
odology. He states that he created his text by examining various books on the sub-
ject of  the science of  morals that had been listed in the curriculum. Interpreting and
abstracting (tercme ve telhis) their contents, he compiled and collected them and
then adorned and buttressed them with one or more appropriate Quråanic verses, tra-
ditions of  the sayings of  the Prophet, and sayings of  the Islamic greats.87 Although
it would be helpful to know what sorts of  texts the author had at his disposal, the fact
that he chose to embroider their discussions with standard Islamic referents is sig-
ni˜cant and underscores his common approach with Ali Łrfan.
Ali Rıza sets about his task of  “adorning and buttressing” in unstinting fashion.
Rare is the discussion that lacks a conspicuously Islamic supporting reference. For
example, the introductory chapter, which takes up the task of  de˜ning morals and
identifying what subjects come under its rubric, contains the Quråanic citation, “wa
innaka laçala khuluqin çazØmin” in the original Arabic (For truly yours is a sublime
nature).88 The text goes on to explain the the verse’s meaning in Turkish, elaborating
on the etymological connection between khuluq and akhlaq: “We created you to be
a great creation, in other words, we combined all of  the good moral qualities together
in you.”89 Numerous examples of  similar citations follow. Indeed, the text is so re-
plete with Islamic references that it makes citing more than a few examples super-
˘uous. The textbook employs such a strategy to comment on a host of  theoretical
and practical moral issues and duties, ranging from the distinguishing between good
and evil to the necessity of  paying taxes and performing military service, but I shall
focus on its approach to the role of  the family in order to compare it with the Rehber.
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Like that text, the Łlm-i Ahlk takes an equivocal view of  the family. On the one
hand, its author acknowledges the importance of  parents for their role as providers
of  education in childhood (sabavet), the time in which the child receives the basis of
his moral development.90 On the other hand, failure at this crucial task can lead to
problems that may be corrected only with extreme di¯culty. “Children deprived of
parental education (ta’lim  terbiye) during their childhood later become immoral.”
The passage goes on to state that examples of  such children being impervious to sub-
sequent attempts to educate them are well known; parents must not show the slight-
est laziness in the performance of  their critical duties of  teaching their children to
ful˜ll their religious obligations and to be endowed with good moral qualities.91 Typ-
ically, a supporting hadith of  the Prophet is supplied here, this time on the authority
of  the Caliph Abu Bakr: “Commence your children to perform their religious duties
and teach them their moral bene˜cences (mekrim-i ahlkiye) from the age of  seven.
When they reach the age of  ten undertake their education (terbiye) and all of  their
good moral qualities (mahasin-i ahlkiye), because childhood is like a green tree;
once it dries it can only be straightened by ˜re.”92
The text’s presentation of  the awesomely demanding parental duties with respect
to education neatly prepares the way for the involvement of  the schoolteacher. Such
duties are described as dual, material and spiritual, with the commensurate potential
for parental error leading to harmful eˆects (mazarrat).93 After once again empha-
sizing that the holiest of  parental responsibilities is to do one’s utmost duty toward
education (including the necessity of  inculcating awareness of  the dangers of  igno-
rance and the bene˜ts of  learning), the author broaches the subject of  schooling.
Some exceptions aside, he says, “education in school is more reliable and more com-
plete than that which takes place among the family.”94 This superiority translates into
tacit support for the teacher’s arrogation of  parental rights.
Since the teacher takes the place of  a child’s parents while he is at school, the teacher has
partial authority to exercise their rights and in˘uence. Because for a period of  time he is
ful˜lling a portion of  the parents’ duties; as a result of  this he is chosen to ful˜ll a portion
of  their rights.
Now, for this reason the child is obliged to render to his teacher the same duties of  respect
and obedience that he owes his parents. These are among the student’s primary duties.95
As in the Rehber, the positive portrayal of  school-derived education is juxtaposed
with the possibility of  trouble in the home environment. If  the in˘uence at home is
bad, the text continues, the teacher will have great di¯culty in removing those ill
eˆects. Thus, the treatment of  the family and its relationship with the schoolteacher,
both positive and negative, shows a marked similarity with that oˆered in the Reh-
ber. In both texts it is clear that the teacher is poised to take on the more important
educational role once the family’s in˘uence has been surpassed.
Thus, despite some important diˆerences in pedagogical approach, both texts ap-
pear strikingly similar in content. Without more information about the process by
which texts were selected for use in the late Ottoman schools, it is impossible to
say for certain whether this convergence represents more than mere coincidence.
Given the attention the state devoted to monitoring the printed word both in the
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realm of  education and more generally, however, it seems that a random coincidence
is quite unlikely. What we can say for certain is that the state school texts devoted to
morals in this period struck a strong blow for enlarging the state’s role vis--vis the
individual student. Even more striking is the role that Islamic referents played in
moral instruction. Although this might seem natural given the late Ottoman policy
of  emphasizing Islam, it nevertheless represented a critical departure from the ex-
isting Tanzimat approach. Thanks to the recent research of  Ak⁄in Somel, we are able
to identify this contrast. Somel’s analysis of  an earlier moral textbook, Sadık Rifat
Pa⁄a’s Ahlk Risalesi of  1847, allows us to see that the Islamic content only im-
plicit in that earlier work is made unavoidably conspicuous in the two later books
I refer to in this article.96 The conscious emphasis our authors placed on explicitly
Islamic references re˘ects the extent to which the Hamidian agenda elicited a
marked contrast to the preceding Tanzimat approach. The fact that it was mainly in
the latter period that empirewide schooling plans were turned into reality underscores
the importance of  this shift toward a consciously indigenous Ottoman and Islamic
agenda. Moreover, by bringing more and more students to board at its schools, the
state was acting to ensure that it imparted its lessons on a nearly full-time basis.
CONCLUSION
Thus, with its teachers infringing on parental roles and its schools accepting a grow-
ing number of  boarding students, the state was edging the family aside. The removal
of  the family from the ˜eld of  education—its moral component, in particular—
cleared the way for the pre-eminence of  the relationship between the state and the
student. The state, acting through the local bureaucrats employed in each school,
now stood in loco parentis, a role made possible by the state’s emphasis on morality.
It is usually understood that the loser in this educational rearrangement was the re-
ligious establishment. Yet the state’s reliance on the ulema in setting the curriculum,
preparing the texts to be used, and in the schools themselves suggests that they were
very much a feature of  state education in this period.
The moral teaching to which the students were exposed in these schools was not
secular. There were, of  course, elements common to most notions of  civic morality,
such as respect for one’s elders or obedience to authority. But it is the speci˜cally
Islamic character of  state-supplied morality that is conspicuous in what we have
been taught to think of  as “secular” schools. Perhaps it makes more sense to call
them “new-style” or, better, “state” schools instead of  “secular” or “modern.”
Much more important than this issue of  semantics is the question of  what this
educational combination meant. A comparative perspective shows that the late
Ottoman Empire was not alone in seeking a mixture of  “traditional” and “modern”
elements. The hybrid nature of  the Ottoman schools, employing an overtly Western
system to impart a message that included both the Western and the “Islamic,” blurs
our usually dichotomized understanding of  late Ottoman society. The mixture of  me-
dium and message inherent in the late Ottoman schools forces us to rethink some of
the key tenets of  late Ottoman history: bifurcation, development of  secularism, even
the monolithic pro˜le of  “the state.” I suggest that the schools be understood as com-
SHORT
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plex and sometimes contradictory institutions of  mixed pedagogical and epistemo-
logical parentage. This composite nature should help us to imagine a wide range of
possibilities for encounter and in˘uence, much wider certainly than the prevailing
treatment—and terminology—have prepared us to envision.
NOTES
Author’s note: This article is a much-revised version of  a paper presented at the Annual Meetings of
the Middle East Studies Association of  North America in November, 1997, in San Francisco. I thank Engin
Akarlı, Robert Fortna, Ulrike Freitag, Hasan Kayalı, Klaus Kreiser, Christoph Schumann, Mark Stein, and
the anonymous IJMES reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. Note on transliteration: For
consistency’s sake, I have rendered all Ottoman Turkish terms according to their modern Turkish forms,
as given in the Redhouse Yeni Trke-Łnglizce Szlk/New Redhouse Turkish–English Dictionary, 12th ed.
(Istanbul: Redhouse Yayınevi, 1991). Relying on Redhouse provides uniformity and reduces the amount
of  diacritical notation while still allowing anyone to recapture the original Ottoman Turkish orthography.
1I am thinking here of  such scholars as Engin D. Akarlı, Selim Deringil, Hasan Kayalı, Elizabeth B.
Frierson, and Carter V. Findley, to name only a few.
2Many have written on the topic. The following monographs rank among the most in˘uential: Niyazi
Berkes, The Development of Secularism Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964); Andreas
Kazamias, Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press,
1966); Bayram Kodaman, Abdlhamid Devri EÜitim Sistemi (Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu, 1988); Hasan
Ali Koer, Trkiye’de Modern EÜitimin DoÜu⁄u ve Geli⁄imi (1773–1923); (Istanbul: Mill EÜitim
Basımevi, 1970); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1968); «erif  Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization
of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962). Separate mention should
be made of  the progenitors of  the ˜eld: Mahmud Cevad, Maarif-i Umumiye Nezareti Tarihe-i Te⁄kilat
ve Łcraati. (Istanbul: Matbaa-ı Amire, 1919–20), and Osman Nuri Ergin, Łstanbul Mektepleri ve Łlim,
Terbiye ve San’at Messeseleri Dolayısıyla Trkiye Maarif Tarihi, 5 vols. (Istanbul: Osmanbey Mat-
baası, 1939–43).
3Most of  the evidence on which my argument rests is derived from idad (preparatory) schools.
4For a recent overview of  the Hamidian attempt to de˜ne the Ottoman image, see Selim Deringil, The
Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).
5Idem, “The Invention of  Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908,” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 35 (1993): 5–6. He states, “Although the state spoke the political
language of  Islam, it was in fact implementing the concrete policy of  a rational secular programme.”
6Comments delivered at the conference “Islam and Modernity,” Banz, Germany, August, 1997. For
ampli˜cation of  Mardin’s notion that “so-called ‘religious’ factors supposedly obstructing social change
sometimes turn out to be so unequivocally and distinctly religious,” see his “Super Westernization in
Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarter of  the Nineteenth Century” in Turkey: Geographic
and Social Perspectives, ed. Peter Benedict, Erol Tmertekin, and Fatma Mansur (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1974), 403–46.
7Charles Tripp, “Islam and the Secular Logic of  the State in the Middle East” in Islamic Fundamentalism,
ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushirvan Ehteshami (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 51–69.
8I am aware of  the tension between an understanding of  modern religion as a source of  worldly mo-
rality for those who follow it and religion conceived as a fund of  moral principles that can be used for
purposes of  political adherence. In this article, I use the term “religion” broadly to include both under-
standings. The problems associated with the changes that religions undergo in the process of  being ˜tted
to modern political needs (and vice versa) are too broad to be treated justly in this context. I thank Engin
Akarlı for alerting me to the wider rami˜cations of  this question.
9William J. Reese, The Origins of the American High School (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1995), 162.
390ıBenjamin C. Fortna
10See Patrick L. Alston, Education and the State in Tsarist Russia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, 1969).
11Jeˆrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917 (Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 47.
12Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of  California Press, 1998).
13Paul Bailey, Reform the People: Changing Attitudes towards Popular Education in Early 20th Cen-
tury China (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 26–27. My thanks to Frank Diktter for this
and other sources on China. For a synopsis of  the situation in Japan, where a similar movement away from
the Western model was exhibited and where moral instruction was also critical in this period, see Roberta
Wollons, “The Black Forest in a Bamboo Garden: Missionary Kindergartens in Japan, 1868–1912,” His-
tory of Education Quarterly 33 (1993): 1–35.
14Paul Bailey, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Marianne Bastid, Educational Reform in Early Twentieth-
Century China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of  Michigan, 1988), vii–xi.
15I would be remiss if  I did not mention the situation in Egypt, technically still an Ottoman possession.
John W. Livingston’s recent article on educational reform in Egypt has highlighted another important
instance of  an attempt to reconcile an exogenous tradition with an indigenous one—namely, Shaykh
Rifaça al-Tahtawi’s quest for an integration of  Western scienti˜c knowledge with Islamic çilm. Although
the dynamics and level of  education were obviously diˆerent, Livingston’s work con˜rms the importance
of  hybridity in educational reform: John W. Livingston, “Western Science and Educational Reform in the
Thought of  Shaykh Rifaça al-Tahtawi,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 28 (1996): 543. For
an excellent treatment of  the issue of  moral education in British Egypt, see Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam
to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley: University of  California
Press, 1998).
16Berkes, Development of Secularism, 179–80.
17Robert Gildea, Education in Provincial France, 1800–1914 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 1, 50; The-
odore Zeldin, France 1848–1945, Vol. II: Intellect, Taste and Anxiety (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 180.
18Zeldin, France 1848–1945; Franois Furet and Jacques Ozouf, Reading and Writing: Literacy in
France from Calvin to Jules Ferry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Mona Ozouf,
L’cole, l’glise et la rpublique, 1871–1914 (Paris: Editions Cana, 1982).
19On French eˆorts to inculcate a “secular” notion of  morality, see Phyllis Stock-Morton, Moral Edu-
cation for a Secular Society: The Development of Morale Laque in Nineteenth Century France (Albany:
State University of  New York Press, 1988).
20The notion of  Weltzeit (world time) was put forward in the context of  Middle Eastern history by
Reinhard Schulze in his Geschichte der Islamischen Welt im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck,
1994), 14 ˆ. and in his “Was ist die Islamische Aufklrung?” Die Welt des Islams 36 (1996): 317–25. For
an English-language account of  the debate over the question of  an “Islamic Enlightenment,” see Knut S.
Vik¿r, “Muhammadan Piety and Islamic Enlightenment: Survey of  a Historiographical Debate,” paper pre-
sented at the ISMM, Istanbul Workshop, July 1998. I thank Ulrike Freitag for bringing this to my attention.
21A point that Deringil makes eˆectively with respect to the Eurasian empires: Deringil, “Invention of
Tradition,” 3. Expanding the basis of  comparison to include China and the United States only underscores
its salience.
22Bernard Lewis uses these terms in describing the intent of  the educational changes of  the Tanzimat:
Lewis, Emergence, 114, 122. They appear in the major related works—that is, those of  Niyazi Berkes,
«erif  Mardin, and Carter Findley. More recent examples, showing that such a view continues to inform the
work of  some of  the best scholars in the ˜eld, include Donald Quataert, “Part IV: The Age of  Reforms,”
in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1916, ed. Halil Łnalcık with Donald
Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 765; and Palmira Brummett, “Dogs, Women,
Cholera, and Other Menaces in the Streets: Cartoon Satire in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–
1911,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995): 433, n. 2.
23For the concept of  cultural dualism, see Berkes, Development, 106 ˆ., esp. 109; Carter V. Findley,
Ottoman Civil O¯cialdom: A Social History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 35–39,
135 ˆ. Even if  one were prepared for argument’s sake to accept the notion, far more credit should be
given, I believe, to the people involved for their ability to assimilate the allegedly opposing tendencies.
SHORT
Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman “Secular” Schoolsı 391
24For recent critiques of  modernization theory, see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and
Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); and Brink-
ley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley:
University of  California Press, 1993).
25Nikki R. Keddie, “Secularism and the State: Towards Clarity and Global Comparison,” New Left
Review 226 (1997): 21–40.
26See my “Education for the Empire: Ottoman State Secondary Schools During the Reign of  Sultan
Abdlhamid II (1876–1909)” (Ph.D. diss., University of  Chicago, 1997).
27Selim Deringil, “The Invention of  Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808–
1908,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 35 (1993): 5–6.
28For reports of  such “seduction” (iÜfal ) in various provinces, see Ba⁄bakanlık Osmanlı Ar⁄ivi (here-
after BOA), Y Mtv. 29/48 (for Syria); BOA, Łrade Maarif  1310 « 5 (for Syria again); Atill etin, “Maarif
Nzırı Ahmed Zhd Pa⁄a’nın Osmanlı ŁmparatorluÜundaki Yabancı Okullar Hakkında Raporu,” Gney-
DoÜu Avrupa Ara⁄tırmaları Dergisi 10–11 (1981–82), 195 ˆ. (an empirewide survey); and BOA, Y Mtv.
180/177 (for Greek in˘uence on Cyprus).
29See, for example, Berkes, Development, 110–16, 179–81.
30The best recent description of  education in the Abdlhamid II period can be found in Deringil, Well-
Protected Domains, 93–111.
31BOA, «D 209/54, 10 Cemaziyelahır 1303/16 March 1886.
32BOA, Y Mtv. 25/52, 6 Cemaziyelahır 1304/2 March 1887.
33Ibid.
34BOA, Łrade Dah. 80409, 4 Cemaziyelevvel 1304/29 January 1887.
35There were, however, courses in the military schools that studied texts devoted to morals. I am
indebted to Bill Blair of  Princeton University for bringing this to my attention.
36BOA, Y A Res. 105/13, 13 Ramazan 1317/15 January 1900.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
39Leyl ve nehar umum mektib-i iddiye-i mlkiye’ye mahsus olarak maarif-i umumiye nezaret-i
celilesince mukaddema tanzim ve bu defa ta’dil ve tashih edilen ders programları ile ta’limat dir (Dersaa-
det [Istanbul]: Asır Matbaası, 1318 [1900/1901]). Evidence of  the pronounced Islamic ˘avor in the state-
school curriculum can also be found in the o¯cial Educational Yearbooks published from 1898 to 1901.
See Salname-i Nezaret-i Maarif-i Umumiye (Istanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1316–1319/1898–1901).
40BOA, Łrade Dahiliye 91851, 24 «aban 1307/15 April 1890.
41Ibid.
42Ibid. The text reads: “Mektib-i Łslmiyede en ziyade riayet olunmak lzım gelen ⁄ey takviye-i
akaid-i Łslmiye maddesi.”
43For a more complete discussion, see my “Education for the Empire,” 140 ˆ. and 237 ˆ.
44See, for example, BOA, Y Mtv. 8/58 (1299); and Y Mtv. 109/17 (1312). Ramadan meant special
rations of  food: olives, cheese, and fruit preserves (reel ): Leyl ve nehar, 273.
45Leyl ve nehar, 234.
46For a record of  the early progress in both opening boarding schools and converting day schools to
accommodate boarders, see BOA, Łrade Maarif  1310 M 7, 25 Muharrem 1310/19 August 1892.
47Leyl ve nehar, 234.
48Ibid., 236–38.
49Ibid., 241.
50Dstr, 1. tertib, vol. 8, 434. I translate this title as “vice-principal” both to avoid confusion with the
assistants (muavin) and because it conjures up the warden-like disciplinary role of  the vice-principal in
American public high schools.
51Ibid.
52Ibid., 435.
53I hope to have more to oˆer on the subject of  school disciplinary cases in subsequent publication.
54For a discussion of  such “adoption,” see Fatma Mge Gek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of
Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press), 68 ˆ.
55«emseddin Sm, Kamus-u Trk (Dersaadet [Istanbul]: Łkdam Matbaası, 1317/1899–1900), 586–87.
392ıBenjamin C. Fortna
56Redhouse translates the phrase fesad-i ahlk as “bad morals, demoralization of  character”: Redhouse
Yeni, s.v. “fesad.”
57Cevdet Pa⁄a’s prescription for the ills befalling the empire’s youth featured a heavy dose of  basic re-
ligious education, including catechism, moral instruction, and even ˜qh: BOA,YEE 18/1860, 24 «aban
1309/24 March 1892.
58See, for example, a report by Education Minister Zhd Pa⁄a that focuses on the spread of  Protestant
missionary schools in the empire. These competing institutions are portrayed as successful due to a com-
bination of  ˜nancial inducements and up-to-date instruction, including religious principles: BOA, YEE
35/232, 19 Muharrem 1311/2 August 1893.
59For the case of  Iraq, see Selim Deringil, “The Struggle against Shiism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in
Ottoman Counter-Propaganda,” Die Welt des Islams 30 (1990); idem, “Invention of  Tradition,” 19–20;
Gkhan etinsaya, “Ottoman Administration of  Iraq, 1890–1908” (Ph.D. diss., Manchester University,
1994); and BOA, YEE 14/188; for Syria, see Deringil, “Invention of  Tradition,” 16. The overall response
is taken up in my “Education for the Empire,” chap. 3.
60Ali Łrfan (EÜriboz), Rehber-i Ahlk (Istanbul: A. Asaduriyan, 1317/1899–1900); Ali Rıza, Łlm-i
Ahlk (Istanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1318/1900–1901]). My thanks are due to the staˆ of  the Istanbul Uni-
versity Rare Book Library, where the text in question was consulted.
61Ali Rıza appears to have been a translator (mtercim) in the palace secretariat (mabeyn); T. C. Kltr
BakanlıÜı, Mill Ktphane Ba⁄kanlıÜı, Trkiye Basmaları Toplu KataloÜu: Arap Har˘ı Trke Eserler
(Ankara: Mill Ktphane Basımevi, 1990), 2:512. This would suggest that his text was written with
Hamidian policy in mind.
62Some of  the best accounts of  “traditional” educational practices in the Islamic world can be found in
Jonathan Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Educa-
tion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Messick, Calligraphic State; and Roy P. Motta-
hedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
63For a recent treatment of  the “traditional” madrasa curriculum in the Sunni world, see Maria Eva
Subtelny and Anas B. Khalidov, “The Curriculum of  Islamic Higher Learning in Timurid Iran in the Light
of  the Sunni Revival under Shah-Rukh,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 115 (1995), 222.
64This seems to have been more common in contemporary Arabic texts.
65The verbal form dir/dır is the most rampant example, appearing on almost every page of  the text.
66For example, Łrfan, Rehber, 53.
67Excluding the brief  Introduction, sixty-eight of  the book’s seventy-six pages of  text (i.e., 89 percent)
employ the question-and-answer format. Those that do not are the last two sections of  the text, which are
devoted to a collection of  verse and prose entries, presumably mnemonic devices that touch on the sub-
jects expounded upon in the bulk of  the text. Parenthetically, the inclusion of  these poems and sayings is
perhaps signi˜cant for the continuity, albeit severely marginalized, with the Perso-Arabic textual tradition
that gave great weight to the poetic.
68The question-and-response format was also a key feature of  European medieval scholastic discourse,
which, of  course, shares much with its counterpart in the Islamic world. In this case, it seems unlikely that
the speci˜cally European tradition would have in˘uenced the creation of  the Rehber in this fashion, but
that possibility is not completely inconceivable.
69Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Fatwa,” by E. Tyan and J. R. Walsh. For speci˜c examples of
fetva-rendering in the 16th-century Ottoman Empire, see ErtuÜrul DzdaÜ, «eyhlislam Ebusud Efendi
Fetvaları I⁄ıÜında 16. Asır Trk Hayatı (Istanbul: Enderun, 1983); and Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud: The
Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
70Berkes, Development, 99.
71Łrfan, Rehber, 10–11. For an expression of  the need to ensure that young students learned the Muslim
credo (ament) in the sıbyan schools, see Ahmed Cevdet’s draft of  a catechism in BOA, YEE 18/1860.
72Łrfan, Rehber, 14. Other examples of  the use of  hadith to support the moral tenets of  the text can be
found in passages relating to contentment (kanaat, p. 26) and restraining the tongue (zabt-ı lisan, p. 40).
On other occasions, the author relies on divine authority without explicitly citing hadith text by stating
that “God has ordained us” to do such and such, or that “God has ordered us” to do such and such. Sim-
ilarly, the Islamic principle of  a duty incumbent upon an individual or the community (farz) is used to
reinforce the necessity of  acting in a certain way. For example, self-restraint (lit., refraining from the pas-
sions of  the self ) is said to be necessary and perhaps obligatory (vacib ve belki farz, p. 43).
Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman “Secular” Schoolsı 393
73Ibid., 43–44. That the sultan was clearly identi˜ed as being the focus of  student loyalty is nothing
new. Students in all of  the state schools frequently had to repeat the phrase padi⁄ahım ok ya⁄a (long live
the sultan), an utterance that was often reinforced by banners that festooned the school buildings during
times of  ceremony or the taking of  o¯cial photographs. For examples of  this phenomenon in military,
civil, and women’s schools see, respectively, Carney E. S. Gavin, ed., Imperial Self-Portrait: The Sultan
Abdlhamid II’s Photographs Albums (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 185 (Bursa); Library of  Congress Pho-
tograph Collection, 9520/81123 (Drama); and Istanbul University Rare Book Library, Photograph Collec-
tion, no. 90496 (Yanya).
74Łrfan, Rehber, 3. The phrase is birer brhan-ı hakikat beyan.
75Cited in M. «kr HanioÜlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995) 23, n. 178. The manuscript from which the quotation is taken is not dated but must have been writ-
ten after his second term as grand vizier, which ended before Abdlhamid acceded the throne in 1876.
76Łrfan, Rehber, 7–8.
77Ibid., 16–17.
78Ibid., 29.
79Ibid., 31 (parentheses supplied in the original).
80Ibid., 40. Interestingly, this saying has a meaning that is directly opposite that of  the familiar—and
patently untrue—playground rejoinder, “Sticks and stones will break my bones, but words will never
hurt me.”
81Ibid., 47. The passage cited is, “Love your father and mother all of  your life with sincerity of  heart,
listen to their commands, and do not engage in bad acts against them.”
82Ibid., 49.
83Ibid., 49–50.
84In time, of  course, states everywhere would act to increase their in loco parentis status even more
through the kindergarten. Ali Łrfan’s suggestion that “everyone should send their children to school while
they are young” hints at the downward trend in the age of  school entry that lay ahead for the Ottoman
Empire and its successor states: ibid., 29. For more on the kindergarten, see my “From Missionary Tool
to Nationalist Mechanism: The Kindergarten in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic,” in Kin-
dergartens and Cultures: The Global Diffusion of an Idea, ed. Roberta Wollons (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 2000).
85Rıza, Łlm-i Ahlk, i. Exactly what this “civil school curriculum book list” (umum mektib-i mlkiye
kitapları programı ) refers to is unclear, but it suggests that the ministry had circulated a list of  texts ap-
propriate for the various courses in the imperial curriculum. (He seems unaware of  Ali Łrfan’s work,
published the previous year.)
86Łrfan, Rehber, 3.
87Rıza, Łlm-i Ahlk, ii. The text reads: ve her bahsı bir veya mteaddid ayat-i celile-i frkaniye ve
ahadis-i ⁄eri˜ye-i nebeviye ve akval-ı kibar-ı Łslmiye ile tezyin ve te’yid.
88Quråan 68:4.
89Rıza, Łlm-i Ahlk, 7.
90Ibid., 187.
91Ibid., 187–88.
92Ibid., 188.
93Ibid., 189.
94Ibid, 190–91. The text reads: mektebdeki ta’lim  terbiye aile arasındaki ta’lim  terbiyeden daha
esaslı ve mkemmel olur.
95Ibid., 191.
96Ak⁄in Somel, “Textbooks as Determiners of  Moral Education in 19th Century Ottoman Muslim
Primary Schools,” paper presented at the European Science Foundation workshop on Education in the
Muslim Mediterranean World, 16 October 1998, Salamanca, Spain.
